Abstract
Werning applies a theorem by Hodges in order to put forward an argument against Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation (understood as a thesis on meaning, not on reference) and in favour of what Werning calls `semantic realism'. We show that the argument rests on two critical premises both of which are false. The reasons for these failures are explained and the actual place of this application of Hodges' theorem within Quine's philosophy of language is outlined.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISSN: | 1572-8420 |
Sprache: | Deutsch |
Dokumenten ID: | 49637 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 28. Mai 2018, 12:38 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2020, 09:38 |