Leitgeb, Hannes (April 2005): What Truth Depends on. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 34, No. 2: pp. 155-192 |
Abstract
What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
ISSN: | 1573-0433 |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 49639 |
Deposited On: | 28. May 2018 12:39 |
Last Modified: | 15. Dec 2020 09:38 |