Abstract
We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially efficient. Finally, we show that a sequential auction under incomplete information can establish the social optimum and discuss some alternative mechanisms that can, under complete information of the entire network, also deliver social efficiency.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Lehrstuhl für Nationalökonomie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D12, D44, D83, J23, J31, J64, M51 |
ISSN: | 1945-7669 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 49892 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 14. Jun. 2018, 09:42 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:27 |