Abstract
Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Medizin |
Themengebiete: | 600 Technik, Medizin, angewandte Wissenschaften > 610 Medizin und Gesundheit |
ISSN: | 0040-5825 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 52336 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 14. Jun. 2018, 09:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:31 |