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Lipski, Joachim (2017): Demotivating Intentional Mentalism. In: Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, Bd. 83, Nr. 4: S. 298-318

Volltext auf 'Open Access LMU' nicht verfügbar.

Abstract

Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.

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