Demotivating Intentional Mentalism

Lipski, Joachim (2017): Demotivating Intentional Mentalism. In: Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 4: pp. 298-318

Abstract

Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Medicine
• Subjects: 600 Technology > 610 Medicine and health
• ISSN: 0040-5825
• Language: English