Vague Credence

Lyon, Aidan (2017): Vague Credence. In: Synthese, Bd. 194, Nr. 10: S. 3931-3954

Abstract

It is natural to think of precise probabilities as being special cases of imprecise probabilities, the special case being when one's lower and upper probabilities are equal. I argue, however, that it is better to think of the two models as representing two different aspects of our credences, which are often (if not always) vague to some degree. I show that by combining the two models into one model, and understanding that model as a model of vague credence, a natural interpretation arises that suggests a hypothesis concerning how we can improve the accuracy of aggregate credences. I present empirical results in support of this hypothesis. I also discuss how this modeling interpretation of imprecise probabilities bears upon a philosophical objection that has been raised against them, the so-called inductive learning problem.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• Sprache: Englisch