Abstract
Existing theory suggests that three "order effects" may emerge in multi-stage tournaments with information feedback. First, participants adjust effort across stages, which could advantage the leading participant who faces a larger " effective prize" after an initial victory (leading-effect). Second, leading participants might engage in sabotage activities to protect their lead thereby decreasing the rivals' output. Finally, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the final stage as they have " nothing to lose" (risk-taking). The expected order effects based on existing theory cannot be supported empirically in a natural experiment setting, where professional teams compete in a two-stage tournament with asymmetric initial conditions and clear incentives.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
ISSN: | 0021-4027 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 55040 |
Date Deposited: | 14. Jun 2018, 09:57 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:35 |