Logo Logo
Hilfe
Hilfe
Switch Language to English

Malmendier, Ulrike und Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 (Februar 2017): You Owe Me. In: American Economic Review, Bd. 107, Nr. 2: S. 493-526

Volltext auf 'Open Access LMU' nicht verfügbar.

Abstract

In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver's intention. Our findings question existing models of social preferences. They point to anthropological and sociological theories about gifts creating an obligation to reciprocate. We capture these effects in a simple extension of existing models. We show that common policy responses (disclosure, size limits) may be ineffective, consistent with our model. Financial incentives are effective but can backfire.

Dokument bearbeiten Dokument bearbeiten