Why emotion recognition is not simulational

Heris, Ali Yousefi (2017): Why emotion recognition is not simulational. In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 6: pp. 711-730

Abstract

According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• Language: English