Abstract
In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less empirically risky.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
ISSN: | 0951-5089 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 55554 |
Date Deposited: | 14. Jun 2018, 09:59 |
Last Modified: | 15. Dec 2020, 09:44 |