Abstract
We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes' contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes' doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as representing preference differences, while being nonetheless empirically related to choices. We highlight the originality, promises and limits of this choice-based cardinalism.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| ISSN: | 1469-9427 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 56448 |
| Date Deposited: | 29. Jun 2018, 09:45 |
| Last Modified: | 15. Dec 2020, 09:45 |
Actions (login required)
- View Item
