
Abstract
People deny health risks, invest too little in disease prevention, and are highly sensitive to the price of preventative health care, especially in developing countries. Moreover, private sector R and D spending on developing-country diseases is almost non-existent. To explain these empirical observations, I propose a model of motivated belief formation, in which an agent's decision to engage in health risk denial balances the psychological benefits of reduced anxiety with the physical cost of underprevention. I use the model to study firms' price-setting behaviour and incentive to innovate. I also show that tax-funded prevention subsidies are welfare enhancing.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | health risk denial; optimal expectations; motivated beliefs; disease prevention; self-protection |
Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D03, I15, I11, I18 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58044-0 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 58044 |
Date Deposited: | 27. Sep 2018, 13:56 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:37 |