Abstract
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | mechanism design; revelation principle; ex-post constraints |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D82 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58046-1 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 58046 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018 13:56 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:37 |

