Abstract
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | mechanism design; revelation principle; ex-post constraints |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58046-1 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 58046 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018, 13:56 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:37 |