Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent (2017): Deterministic Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Ex-Post Constraints. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 32 |
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Abstract
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.
Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
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Keywords: | mechanism design; revelation principle; ex-post constraints |
Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D82 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58046-1 |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 58046 |
Deposited On: | 27. Sep 2018 13:56 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:37 |
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