Abstract
Overbidding in auctions has been attributed to e.g. risk aversion, loser regret, level-k, and cursedness, relying on varying identifying assumptions. I argue that "type projection'" organizes these findings and largely captures observed behavior. Type projection formally models that people tend to believe others have object values similar to their own - a robust psychological phenomenon that naturally applies to auctions. First, I show that type projection generates the main behavioral phenomena observed in auctions, including increased sense of competition ("loser regret") and broken Bayesian updating ("cursedness"). Second, re-analyzing data from seven experiments, I show that type projection explains the stylized facts of behavior across private and common value auctions. Third, in a structural analysis relaxing the identifying assumptions made in earlier studies, type projection consistently captures behavior best, in-sample and out-of-sample. The results reconcile bidding patterns across conditions and have implications for behavioral and empirical analyses as well as policy.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper | 
|---|---|
| Keywords: | auctions; overbidding; projection; risk aversion; cursed equilibrium; depth of reasoning | 
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" | 
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | 
| JEL Classification: | C72, C91, D44 | 
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58048-3 | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 58048 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018 13:56 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:37 | 
		
	
