Abstract
We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased preferences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual's long-run self. If agents interact repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving teamwork can help to improve performance. The mutual promise to work harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this promise - which leads to individual underproduction in the future and hence a reduction of future utility.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | self-control problems; teamwork; relational contracts |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | L22, L23 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58054-6 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 58054 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018 13:56 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:37 |

