Abstract
We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased preferences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual's long-run self. If agents interact repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving teamwork can help to improve performance. The mutual promise to work harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this promise - which leads to individual underproduction in the future and hence a reduction of future utility.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | self-control problems; teamwork; relational contracts |
| Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | L22, L23 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58054-6 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 58054 |
| Date Deposited: | 27. Sep 2018 13:56 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:37 |

