Abstract
In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation principle holds if allocations are modelled as the Cartesian product of outcomes and verifiable information, giving rise to evidence-contingent mechanisms. Consequently, incentive constraints characterize the implementable set. The revelation principle does not hold when an allocation is modelled as only an outcome so that mechanisms are non-contingent. Yet, any outcome implementable by an evidence-contingent mechanism is implementable by a non-contingent mechanism, provided it can both extend and restrict reporting information. A type-independent bad outcome implies the latter property.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | revelation principle; mechanism design; verifiable information |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58057-2 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 58057 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018, 13:56 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:37 |