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Strausz, Roland (2017): Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 45 [PDF, 283kB]

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Abstract

In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation principle holds if allocations are modelled as the Cartesian product of outcomes and verifiable information, giving rise to evidence-contingent mechanisms. Consequently, incentive constraints characterize the implementable set. The revelation principle does not hold when an allocation is modelled as only an outcome so that mechanisms are non-contingent. Yet, any outcome implementable by an evidence-contingent mechanism is implementable by a non-contingent mechanism, provided it can both extend and restrict reporting information. A type-independent bad outcome implies the latter property.

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