Abstract
Recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers. We analyze the optimal timing of such choice-enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them. In our model, a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal. We show that a policy intending to enhance consumers choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare. By contrast, a choice-enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly. Our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper | 
|---|---|
| Keywords: | active choice; automatic renewal; automatic enrollment; procrastination; consumer naivete; present bias | 
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" | 
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | 
| JEL Classification: | D03, D18, D21, D40, L51 | 
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58061-5 | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 58061 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018 13:56 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:37 | 
		
	
