Abstract
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper | 
|---|---|
| Keywords: | contest; tournament; real-effort; experiment; contract theory; forward-looking | 
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" | 
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | 
| JEL Classification: | C91, D91, J22, J33, L02, M05 | 
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58072-6 | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 58072 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018 13:57 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:37 | 
		
	
