Abstract
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | contest; tournament; real-effort; experiment; contract theory; forward-looking |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C91, D91, J22, J33, L02, M05 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58072-6 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 58072 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018, 13:57 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:37 |