The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Schindler, David; Schudy, Simeon (2018): The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 71

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers' willingness to "explore" original solutions.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: team work; bonus; incentives; loss; gain; non-routine; exploration
• Faculties: Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition"
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C92, C93, J33, D03, M52
• Language: English