Abstract
Firms often set long notice periods when consumers cancel a contract, and sometimes do so even when the costs of changing or canceling the contract are small. We investigate a model in which a firm offers a contract to consumers who may procrastinate canceling it due to naive present-bias. We show that the firm may set a long notice period to exploit naive consumers.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | notice periods; procrastination; present bias; time inconsistency; consumer naivete |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D04, D18, D21, D40, D90, L51 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58121-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 58121 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 27. Sep. 2018, 13:57 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:37 |