Abstract
Firms often set long notice periods when consumers cancel a contract, and sometimes do so even when the costs of changing or canceling the contract are small. We investigate a model in which a firm offers a contract to consumers who may procrastinate canceling it due to naive present-bias. We show that the firm may set a long notice period to exploit naive consumers.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | notice periods; procrastination; present bias; time inconsistency; consumer naivete |
| Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D04, D18, D21, D40, D90, L51 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58121-8 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 58121 |
| Date Deposited: | 27. Sep 2018 13:57 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:37 |

