Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of "taxpayers" vote for the public transfer.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | stigma; signaling; redistribution; non take-up; welfare program |
Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C91, D03, H31, I38 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58124-5 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 58124 |
Date Deposited: | 27. Sep 2018, 13:57 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:37 |