Abstract
Different models of uncertainty aversion imply strikingly different economic behavior. The key to understanding these differences lies in the dichotomy between first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion, which I define here. My definition and its characterization are independent of specific representations of decisions under uncertainty. I show that with second-order ambiguity aversion, a positive exposure to ambiguity is optimal if and only if there is a subjective belief such that the act’s expected outcome is positive. With first-order ambiguity aversion, zero exposure to ambiguity can be optimal. Examples in finance, insurance, and contracting demonstrate the economic relevance of this dichotomy.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82, D01, D81, G11 |
ISSN: | 0025-1909 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 60012 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 23. Jan. 2019, 15:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:38 |