Abstract
We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real-world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0347-0520 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 62816 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 19. Jul. 2019, 12:11 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:40 |