Logo Logo
Help
Contact
Switch Language to German
Kauder, Björn; Krause, Manuela; Potrafke, Niklas (2018): Electoral cycles in MPs' salaries: evidence from the German states. In: International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 25, No. 4: pp. 981-1000
Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.

Abstract

Members of parliament (MPs) often set their own salaries. Voters dislike self-serving politicians, and politicians are keen to please voters. In line with political business cycle theories, politicians thus may delay giving themselves a salary increase until after elections. We investigate electoral cycles in the salary increases of German state MPs. Using data for 15 states over the period 1980-2014, we find no evidence that increases in MP salaries are influenced by election cycles. Politicians can increase their salaries at any point during the legislative period without negative consequences. We posit that this may be because even those voters who are most disenchanted with politics likely understand that all politicians benefit from a salary increase and thus do not punish the governing party at the polls.