Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects

Abasnezhad, Ali and Jenkins, C. S. (2018): Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects. In: Thought-A Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 4: pp. 278-283

Abstract

Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes-Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes-Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides grounds for rejecting them.

• Item Type: Journal article
• EU Funded Grant Agreement Number: 675415
• EU Projects: Horizon 2020 > Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions > Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks > 675415: Diaphora: Philosophical Problems, Resilience and Persistent Disagreement
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic
• ISSN: 2161-2234
• Language: English