Abstract
According to a popular interpretation, Carnap's interpretation of probability had evolved from a logical towards a subjective conception. However Carnap himself insisted that his basic philosophical view of probability was always the same. I address this apparent dash between Carnap's self-identification and the subsequent interpretations of his work. Following its original intentions, I reconstruct inductive logic as an explication. The emerging picture is of a versatile linguistic framework, whose main function is not the discovery of objective logical relations in the object language, but the stipulation of conceptual possibilities. Within this representation, I map out the changes that the project went through. Seen from such an explication-based perspective, inductive logic becomes quite hard to categorize using the standard labels.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
ISSN: | 0026-9662 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 65979 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 19. Jul. 2019, 12:18 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:46 |