Abstract
According to a popular interpretation, Carnap's interpretation of probability had evolved from a logical towards a subjective conception. However Carnap himself insisted that his basic philosophical view of probability was always the same. I address this apparent dash between Carnap's self-identification and the subsequent interpretations of his work. Following its original intentions, I reconstruct inductive logic as an explication. The emerging picture is of a versatile linguistic framework, whose main function is not the discovery of objective logical relations in the object language, but the stipulation of conceptual possibilities. Within this representation, I map out the changes that the project went through. Seen from such an explication-based perspective, inductive logic becomes quite hard to categorize using the standard labels.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
| ISSN: | 0026-9662 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 65979 |
| Date Deposited: | 19. Jul 2019 12:18 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:46 |
