Abstract
In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to the political part, I argue that the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political facts, is indeed politically valuable. To develop my argument, I show first that an evaluative kind of knowledge is relevant for reaching a sophisticated level of political cognition, and second that emotions contribute distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I conclude that, when emotional experiences towards political events are coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can ground a distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political perspective.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel | 
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft | 
| Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie | 
| ISSN: | 0048-3893 | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 66010 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 19. Jul. 2019 12:18 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:46 | 
 
		 
	 
    


