The Stories of Logics

Kapsner, Andreas (31. Juli 2019): The Stories of Logics. In: The Australasian Journal of Logic, Bd. 16, Nr. 4: S. 133-158

Abstract

In this paper, I investigate in how far we can use fictional stories to learn about logic. How can we engage with fiction in order to come to find out what logical principles are actually valid? Is that possible at all? I claim that it is, and I propose two case studies to make the point.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Publikationsform: Publisher's Version
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie ; 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik
• ISSN: 1448-5052
• Sprache: Englisch

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