Variety of Evidence

Landes, Jürgen (10. Juli 2018): Variety of Evidence. In: Erkenntnis: S. 1-41

Abstract

Varied evidence confirms more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys widespread intuitive support. We put forward a novel explication of one notion of varied evidence and the Variety of Evidence Thesis within Bayesian models of scientific inference by appealing to measures of entropy. Our explication of the Variety of Evidence Thesis holds in many of our models which also pronounce on disconfirmatory and discordant evidence. We argue that our models pronounce rightly. Against a backdrop of failures of the Variety of Evidence Thesis, the intuitive case for the Variety of Evidence Thesis emerges strengthened. Our models do however not support the general case for the thesis since our explication of it fails to hold in certain cases. The parameter space of this failure is explored and an explanation for the failure is offered.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• EU Funded Grant Agreement Number: 639276
• EU-Projekte: Horizon 2020 > ERC Grants > ERC Starting Grant > ERC Grant 639276: PhilPharm - Philosophy of Pharmacology: Safety, Statistical Standards and Evidence Amalgamation
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie ; 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 120 Epistemologie
• ISSN: 0165-0106
• Sprache: Englisch

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