Abstract
In standard model-theoretic semantics, the meaning of logical terms is said to be fixed in the system while that of nonlogical terms remains variable. Much effort has been devoted to characterizing logical terms, those terms that should be fixed, but little has been said on their role in logical systems: on what fixing their meaning precisely amounts to. My proposal is that when a term is considered logical in model theory, what gets fixed is its intension rather than its extension. I provide a rigorous way of spelling out this idea, and show that it leads to a graded account of logicality: the less structure a term requires in order for its intension to be fixed, the more logical it is. Finally, I focus on the class of terms that are invariant under isomorphisms, as they render themselves more easily to mathematical treatment. I propose a mathematical measure for the logicality of such terms based on their associated Löwenheim numbers.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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EU Funded Grant Agreement Number: | 675415 |
EU-Projekte: | Horizon 2020 > Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions > Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks > 675415: Diaphora: Philosophical Problems, Resilience and Persistent Disagreement |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISSN: | 1755-0211 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 69275 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 23. Okt. 2019, 14:25 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:51 |
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