Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness

Abasnezhad, Ali (28. January 2019): Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness. In: Inquiry, Vol. 62

Abstract

Miriam Schoenfield argues that moral realism and moral vagueness imply ontic vagueness. In particular, she argues that neither shifty nor rigid semantic accounts of vagueness can provide a satisfactory explanation of moral vagueness for moral realists. This paper constitutes a response. I argue that Schoenfield's argument against the shifty semantic account presupposes that moral indeterminacies can, in fact, be resolved determinately by crunching through linguistic data. I provide different reasons for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, I argue that Schoenfield's rejection of the rigid semantic account is based on a presupposition that ultimately implies the very same claim that is under dispute: the vagueness of moral predicates in imperfect languages persists in the perfect language, as well.

• Item Type: Journal article
• EU Funded Grant Agreement Number: 675415
• EU Projects: Horizon 2020 > Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions > Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Networks > 675415: Diaphora: Philosophical Problems, Resilience and Persistent Disagreement
• Keywords: Moral realism, moral vagueness, ontic vagueness, semantic accounts of vagueness, epistemicism, moral indeterminacy
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy; 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 170 Ethics
• ISSN: 0020-174X, 1502-3923
• Language: English