Abstract
Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-73129-0 |
ISSN: | 0925-4560 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 73129 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 24. Aug. 2020, 13:23 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:53 |