Abstract
Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-73129-0 |
ISSN: | 0925-4560 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 73129 |
Date Deposited: | 24. Aug 2020, 13:23 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:53 |