Regulatory and Bailout Decisions in a Banking Union

Haufler, Andreas (27. May 2021): Regulatory and Bailout Decisions in a Banking Union. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 290

Abstract

We model a banking union of two countries whose banking sectors di↵er in their average probability of failure and externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory (supervisory) decision of which banks are to be shut down before they can go bankrupt, and (ii) a bailout decision of who pays for banks that have failed despite regulatory oversight. Each of these choices can either be taken in a centralized or in a decentralized way. In our benchmark model the two countries always agree on a centralized regulation policy. In contrast, bailout policies are centralized only when international spillovers from cross-border bank ownership are strong, and banking sectors are highly profitable

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: banking union, bank regulation, bailout policies
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition"
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: G28, F33, H87
• Language: English