
Abstract
Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position’s factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one’s position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a ten-fold increase in incentives for accuracy.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C93, D72, D83, D91 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-78044-1 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 78044 |
Date Deposited: | 01. Dec 2021, 12:18 |
Last Modified: | 01. Dec 2021, 12:18 |