Abstract
People deny health risks, invest too little in disease prevention, and are highly sensitive to the price of preventative health care, especially in developing countries. Moreover, private sector R&D spending on developing-country diseases is almost non-existent. To explain these empirical observations, I propose a model of motivated belief formation, in which an agent's decision to engage in health risk denial balances the psychological benefits of reduced anxiety with the physical cost of underprevention. I use the model to study firms' price-setting behavior and incentive to innovate. I also show that tax-funded prevention subsidies are welfare enhancing. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0167-6296 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 78288 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Dez. 2021, 14:43 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2021, 14:43 |