Thick Concepts and Moral Revisionism in Plato's Gorgias: Arguing About Something There Can Be No Argument About

Bruellmann, Philipp (2019): Thick Concepts and Moral Revisionism in Plato's Gorgias: Arguing About Something There Can Be No Argument About. In: Phronesis-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, Bd. 65, Nr. 2: S. 153-178

Abstract

David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles' immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato's Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles, is precisely addressing the thickness of the concept of justice: it reveals that this concept is both descriptive and evaluative and that formulating a revisionist position about justice is therefore extremely difficult. Callicles' strategy is best read as a response to this difficulty, which sets the stage for Socrates' revisionist account of justice.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
• ISSN: 0031-8868
• Sprache: Englisch