Practical reason is not the will: Kant and Reinhold's dilemma

Noller, Jörg (2019): Practical reason is not the will: Kant and Reinhold's dilemma. In: European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 4: pp. 852-864

Abstract

Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the so-called Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self-determination.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 0966-8373
• Language: English