Abstract
The problem of old evidence, first described by Glymour [1980], is still widely regarded as one of the most pressing foundational challenges to the Bayesian account of scientific reasoning. Many solutions have been proposed, but all of them have drawbacks and none is considered to be definitive. Here, we introduce and defend a new kind of solution, according to which hypotheses are confirmed when we become more confident that they provide the only way of accounting for the known evidence.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0004-8402 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 81761 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Dez. 2021, 14:59 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2021, 14:59 |