Abstract
The problem of old evidence, first described by Glymour [1980], is still widely regarded as one of the most pressing foundational challenges to the Bayesian account of scientific reasoning. Many solutions have been proposed, but all of them have drawbacks and none is considered to be definitive. Here, we introduce and defend a new kind of solution, according to which hypotheses are confirmed when we become more confident that they provide the only way of accounting for the known evidence.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
ISSN: | 0004-8402 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 81761 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Dec 2021, 14:59 |
Last Modified: | 15. Dec 2021, 14:59 |