Abstract
In this paper we argue that Kripke's causal theory of reference does not provide necessary conditions for reference. For example, we show that Kripke's theory cannot explain that when interchanging two names also the referents of the two names are interchanged. Since these examples of reference change are significantly different from Evans' examples of reference change, even Devitt's extension of Kripke's theory cannot explain them. Concluding, we show that Evans' theory in (Evans, 1973;cf. 1985) and (Evans, 1982) provides a single explanation of both Evans' examples and the examples of interchanged names.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0044-3301 |
Sprache: | Deutsch |
Dokumenten ID: | 81782 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Dez. 2021, 14:59 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2021, 14:59 |