Abstract
In this paper we argue that Kripke's causal theory of reference does not provide necessary conditions for reference. For example, we show that Kripke's theory cannot explain that when interchanging two names also the referents of the two names are interchanged. Since these examples of reference change are significantly different from Evans' examples of reference change, even Devitt's extension of Kripke's theory cannot explain them. Concluding, we show that Evans' theory in (Evans, 1973;cf. 1985) and (Evans, 1982) provides a single explanation of both Evans' examples and the examples of interchanged names.
Item Type: | Journal article |
---|---|
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
ISSN: | 0044-3301 |
Language: | German |
Item ID: | 81782 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Dec 2021, 14:59 |
Last Modified: | 15. Dec 2021, 14:59 |