Abstract
In the literature over the Ramsey-sentence approach to structural realism, there is often debate over whether structural realists can legitimately restrict the range of the second-order quantifiers, in order to avoid the Newman problem. In this paper, I argue that even if they are allowed to, it won't help: even if the Ramsey sentence is interpreted using such restricted quantifiers, it is still an implausible candidate to capture a theory's structural content. To do so, I use the following observation: if a Ramsey sentence did encode a theory's structural content, then two theories would be structurally equivalent just in case they have logically equivalent Ramsey sentences. I then argue that this criterion for structural equivalence is implausible, even where frame or Henkin semantics are used.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
| Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
| ISSN: | 0165-0106 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 81798 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Dez. 2021 14:59 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2021 14:59 |
