Abstract
We present SECCSL, a concurrent separation logic for proving expressive, data-dependent information flow security properties of low-level programs. SECCSL is considerably more expressive, while being simpler, than recent compositional information flow logics that cannot reason about pointers, arrays etc. To capture security concerns, SECCSL adopts a relational semantics for its assertions. At the same time it inherits the structure of traditional concurrent separation logics;thus SECCSL reasoning can be automated via symbolic execution. We demonstrate this by implementing SECC, an automatic verifier for a subset of the C programming language, which we apply to a range of benchmarks.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Mathematik, Informatik und Statistik > Informatik |
Themengebiete: | 000 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke > 004 Informatik |
ISSN: | 0302-9743 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 82329 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Dez. 2021, 15:01 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2021, 15:01 |