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Liebrich, Felix-Benedikt; Svindland, Gregor (2019): Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 84: pp. 28-45
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We study the problem of optimising the aggregated utility within a system of agents under the assumption that individual utility assessments are law-invariant: they rank Savage acts merely in terms of their distribution under a fixed reference probability measure. We present a unifying framework in which optimisers can be found which are comonotone allocations of an aggregated quantity. Our approach can be localised to arbitrary rearrangement invariant commodity spaces containing at least all bounded wealths. The aggregation procedure is a substantial degree of freedom in our study. Depending on the choice of aggregation, the optimisers of the optimisation problems are allocations of a wealth with desirable economic efficiency properties, such as (weakly, biased weakly, and individually rationally) Pareto efficient allocations, core allocations, and systemically fair allocations. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.